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Abstract
GNSS-dependent positioning, navigation and timing synchronization proce-
dures have a signiﬁcant impact on everyday life. Therefore, such a widely
used system is becoming an attractive target for terrorists and hackers for
various motives. As a consequence, spooﬁng and antispooﬁng algorithms
have become an important research topic within the GNSS discipline. In this
thesis the environment of a ﬁxed single-antenna spoofer and a ﬁxed multi-
antenna receiver is analysed and a new algorithm for spooﬁng detection is
proposed which uses diﬀerential GNSS measurements.
viii
Chapter 1
Introduction
GNSS-dependent systems are widespread in current positioning and naviga-
tion applications. There is an increasing attention to safe and secure GNSS
applications such as air, marine and ground transportations, police and res-
cue services, telecommunication systems and mobile phone. Nowadays, most
mobile phones as well as vehicles are equipped with positioning and naviga-
tion systems utilizing GNSS systems. In addition, countless time tagging and
synchronization systems in the industries rely primarily on GNSS. As a con-
sequence, GNSS systems is becoming an attractive target for illicit disruption
by terrorists and hackers.
GNSS signals are vulnerable to in-band interferences because of being
extremely weak broadcast signals over wireless channels. Therefore, it is suf-
ﬁcient a low-power interference to jam or spoof GNSS receivers for several
kilometres of distance. For example, spooﬁng attack could eﬀectively deceive
an activity monitoring GNSS receiver mounted on a cargo transport. There-
fore, the GNSS receiver will be logging a counterfeit trajectory with various
consequences.
Spooﬁng and antispooﬁng mechanisms are emerging issues in modern
GNSS applications that will increasingly attract research in future [1]. Spoof-
ing is a deliberate interference that aims to force GNSS receivers in generat-
ing false position solutions [2]. The spoofer attempts to resemble authentic
GNSS signals in order to mislead the target receiver. Recently the imple-
mentation of sophisticated spoofers has become more feasible and less costly
due to rapid advances in software-deﬁned radio (SDR) technology [4].
This thesis investigates this problem on applications where there is a
ﬁxed receiver with multiple antennas exploiting Diﬀerential GNSS (DGNSS)
measurements. This environment corresponds to diﬀerent applications such
as mobile phone network cells.
The thesis is organized as follows: an overview on how a GNSS system
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works in chapter 2 followed by the description of the signal model considered
for the proposed algorithm in chapter 2. Then there is chapter 3 which
describes what spooﬁng is and the most famous countermeasures with the
description of the improved algorithm which is based on the results on [3].
In chapter 4 i will be shown the proposed algorithm performance in spooﬁng
detection and spoofed satellites identiﬁcation. Concluding considerations are
provided in chapter 5.
Chapter 2
GNSS system description
In this chapter it will be described the fundamental concepts to understand
how a GNSS system works starting from the geometrical properties of the
satellite constellation to fulﬁl all the GNSS requirements to calculate the user
position. Moreover, there is a part where it is described the two process of
the receiver which permit to the user to discover which satellites are in view
and, subsequently, to track them.
2.1 Constellation
Satellite navigation constellations have very diﬀerent geometrical constraints
from satellite communications systems, ﬁrst of all the multiplicity of coverage.
The navigation solution requires a minimum of four satellites to be in view of
a user to provide the minimum of four measurements necessary to determine
three-dimensional position and time. Therefore, a constraint on the constel-
lation is that it must provide a minimum of coverage of four satellites at all
times. In order to ensure this level of coverage, the nominal constellation was
designed to provide more than four satellites in view so that this constraint
can be maintained even with a satellite runs out of service. Also, more than
four satellites in view is useful for user equipment to be able to determine if
a satellite is measuring a signal or timing anomaly. Therefore, the practical
constraint for coverage of the constellation is a minimum six satellites in view
above 5◦ minimum elevation angle. The problem of constellation design for
satellite navigation has the following major constraints:
1. Coverage needs to be global.
2. At least six satellites need to be in view of any user position at all
times.
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3. The constellation needs to have good geometric properties, which re-
quires a dispersion of satellites in both azimuth and elevation angle
from a user.
4. The constellation needs to be robust against single satellite failures.
5. The constellation must be maintainable given the increased frequency
of satellite failures with a large constellation.
6. It is preferable to minimize the frequency and magnitude of manoeuvres
required to maintain the satellites within the required range of their
orbital parameters.
7. There are trade-oﬀs between the distance of the satellite from the sur-
face of the Earth versus payload weight.
In particular, for the GPS constellation a 6-plane conﬁguration was se-
lected with four satellites per plane. The orbital planes are inclined by 55◦,
in accordance with Walker's results. The planes are equally spaced by 60◦
in right ascension of the ascending node around the equator. Satellites are
not equally spaced within the planes, and there are phase oﬀsets between
planes to achieve improved geometric dilution of precision characteristics of
the constellation. Hence, the GPS constellation can be considered a tailored
Walker constellation. For a complete description of the Walker constellation
read [5].
2.2 Calculating user position
In order to determine user position in three dimensions (xu, yu, zu) and the
oﬀset tu, pseudorange measurements are made to four satellites resulting in
the system of equations
ρj =‖ sj − u ‖ +ctu (2.1)
where j ranges from 1 to 4 and references the satellites. Equation can be
expanded into the following set of equations in the unknowns xu, yu, zu, and
tu:
ρ1 =
√
(x1 − xu)2 + (y1 − yu)2 + (z1 − zu)2 + ctu (2.2)
ρ2 =
√
(x2 − xu)2 + (y2 − yu)2 + (z2 − zu)2 + ctu (2.3)
ρ3 =
√
(x3 − xu)2 + (y3 − yu)2 + (z3 − zu)2 + ctu (2.4)
ρ4 =
√
(x4 − xu)2 + (y4 − yu)2 + (z4 − zu)2 + ctu (2.5)
where xj, yj, and zj denote the jth satellite's position in three dimensions.
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2.3 Satellite signal acquisition
Signal acquisition is a search process. This search process, like the tracking
process, requires replication of both the code and the carrier of the space
vehicle (SV) to acquire the SV signal. The range dimension is associated
with the replica code. The Doppler dimension is associated with the replica
carrier. The initial search process is always a C/A code search for C/A code
receivers and usually begins with a C/A code search for P(Y) code receivers.
The initial C/A code search usually involves replicating all 1,023 C/A code
phase states in the range dimension. Some criteria must be established to
determine when to terminate the search process for a given SV and select
another candidate SV. Fortunately, the range dimension for C/A code search
is bounded by the ambiguity of C/A code to only 1,023 chips total range
uncertainty, but it is essentially unbounded for direct P(Y) code search.
One Doppler bin is deﬁned as approximately 2/(3T ), where T = signal
integration time per cell or dwell time per cell. Dwell times can vary from
less than 1 ms (Doppler bins of about 667 Hz) for good C/N0 signals up
to 10 ms (67-Hz Doppler bins) for bad C/N0 signals. Unfortunately, the
actual C/N0 is unknown until after the SV signal is acquired. Signal ob-
scuration, RF interference, ionospheric scintillation and antenna gain roll-oﬀ
can all signiﬁcantly reduce C/N0. The search pattern usually follows the
range direction from early to late in order to avoid multipath with Doppler
held constant until all range bins are searched for each Doppler value. In
the Doppler bin direction, the search pattern typically starts from the mean
value of the Doppler uncertainty and then continues one Doppler bin at a
time on either side of this value until the 3-sigma Doppler uncertainty has
been searched. Then the search pattern is repeated, typically with a reduc-
tion in the search threshold scale factor. It is important to recognize that
the C/A code autocorrelation and crosscorrelation sidelobes can cause false
signal detections if these sidelobes are strong enough. The sidelobes tend to
increase as the search dwell time is decreased. To counter this problem, a
combination of both increased dwell time (to minimize sidelobes) and a high
detector threshold setting (to reject sidelobes) can be used for the initial
search pass. On subsequent search passes, the dwell time and threshold can
be decreased. The penalty for this scheme is increased search time when the
C/N0 is low. During the dwell time, T , in each cell, the I (In-Phase) and
Q (Quadrature-Phase) signals are integrated and dumped and the envelope√
I2 +Q2 is computed. Each envelope is compared to a threshold to deter-
mine the presence or absence of the SV signal. The detection of the signal
is a statistical process because each cell either contains noise with the signal
absent or noise with the signal present. Each case has its own probability
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density function (pdf). The pdf for noise with no signal present, pn(z), has
a zero mean. The pdf for noise with the signal present, ps(z), has a nonzero
mean. The threshold is usually based on an acceptable probability of false
alarm, Pfa. For the chosen threshold, Vt, any cell envelope that is at or above
the threshold is detected as the presence of the signal. Any cell envelope that
is below the threshold is detected as noise. There are four outcomes of the
decision processes, two wrong and two right. The two statistics that are of
most interest for the signal detection process are the probability of detection,
Pd, and the probability of false alarm, Pfa. These are determined as follows:
Pd =
∫ inf
Vt
psdz (2.6)
Pfa =
∫ inf
Vt
pndz (2.7)
where:
• ps(z) = pdf of the envelope in the presence of the signal
• pn(z) = pdf of the envelope with the signal absent
To determine these pdfs, assume that I and Q have a Gaussian distribu-
tion. Assuming that the envelope is formed by
√
I2 +Q2, then ps(z) is a
Ricean distribution [15] deﬁned by:
ps(z) =
 zσ2n e
−( z2+A2
2σ2n
)
I0(
zA
σ2n
), z ≥ 0
0, z < 0
(2.8)
where:
• z = value of the random variable
• σ2 = RMS noise power
• A = RMS signal amplitude
• I0( zAσ2n ) = modiﬁed Bessel function of zero order
Equation (2.8) for z ≥ 0 can be expressed in terms of the predetection SNR
as presented to the envelope detector, C/N , as follows:
ps(z) =
z
σ2n
e
−( z2
2σ2n
+C/N)
I0(
z
√
2C/N
σn
) (2.9)
where:
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• C/N = predetection signal to noise ratio
• C/N = A2/2σ2n = (C/N)T
• T = search dwell time
For the case where there is no signal present, then evaluating (2.8) for
A = 0 yields a Rayleigh distribution for pn(z), which is deﬁned by:
pn(z) =
z
σ2n
e
−( z2
2σ2n
)
(2.10)
The result of integrating (2.7) using the pdf of (2.10) is:
pfa = e
−( V
2
t
2σ2n
)
(2.11)
Rearranging (2.11) yields the threshold in terms of the desired probability
of false alarm and the measured 1-sigma noise power:
Vt = σn
√−2 lnPfa = Xσn (2.12)
For example, if it is desired that Pfa = 16%, then Vt = Xσn = 1.9144615σn.
Using this result, the probability of detection, Pd, is computed for the ex-
pected C/N0 and dwell time, T , using (2.6) and (2.9) with σn = 1 (normal-
ized).
2.4 Satellite signal tracking
There are two diﬀerent approaches to track a signal satellite. One which
utilizes a replica of the carrier of the signal satellite, called Carrier tracking
loop, and the other utilizes a replica of the satellite PRN code, called Code
tracking loop. In this section these two techniques will be described.
2.4.1 Carrier tracking loop
Figure 2.1 presents a block diagram of a receiver carrier tracking loop. The
designs of the carrier predetection integrators, the carrier loop discrimina-
tors and the carrier loop ﬁlters characterize the receiver carrier tracking loop.
These three functions determine the two most important performance char-
acteristics of the receiver carrier loop design: the carrier loop thermal noise
error and the maximum LOS dynamic stress threshold. Since the carrier
tracking loop is always the weak link in a stand-alone GNSS receiver, its
threshold characterizes the unaided GNSS receiver performance.
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Figure 2.1: Generic GNSS receiver carrier tracking loop block diagram (Fig.
from [11]
The carrier loop discriminator deﬁnes the type of tracking loop as a PLL,
a Costas PLL, which is a PLL-type discriminator that tolerates the pres-
ence of data modulation on the baseband signal, or a frequency lock loop
(FLL). The PLL and the Costas loop are the most accurate, but they are
more sensitive to dynamic stress than the FLL. The PLL and Costas loop
discriminators produce phase error estimates at their outputs. The FLL dis-
criminator produces a frequency error estimate. Because of this, there is also
a diﬀerence in the architecture of the loop ﬁlter.
To tolerate dynamic stress, the predetection integration time should be
short, the discriminator should be an FLL, and the carrier loop ﬁlter band-
width should be wide. However, for the carrier measurements to be accurate,
the predetection integration time should be long, the discriminator should
be a PLL, and the carrier loop ﬁlter noise bandwidth should be narrow. As
a consequence some compromises must be made to resolve this opposite re-
quirements. A well-designed GNSS receiver should close its carrier tracking
loops with short predetection integration times, using an FLL and a wide-
band carrier loop ﬁlter. Assuming there is data modulation on the carrier,
it should then automatically change into a Costas PLL, gradually adjusting
the predetection integration time equal to the period of the data transitions
while also gradually adjusting the carrier tracking loop bandwidth as narrow
as the dynamics permits.
2.4.2 Code tracking loop
Figure 2.2 shows a block diagram of a GNSS receiver code tracking loop.
The designs of the predetection integrators, the code loop discriminator and
the code loop ﬁlter characterize the receiver code tracking loop. These three
functions determine the most important two performance characteristics of
2.4. SATELLITE SIGNAL TRACKING 9
Figure 2.2: Generic GNSS receiver code tracking loop block diagram (Fig.
from [11]
the receiver code loop design: the code loop thermal noise error and the
maximum LOS dynamic stress threshold. Even though the carrier tracking
loop is the weaker in terms of the receiver's dynamic stress threshold, it
would be disastrous to attempt to aid the carrier loop with the code loop
output. This is because the code loop thermal noise is orders of magnitude
larger than the carrier loop thermal noise. In general coherent DLL provides
superior performance when the carrier loop is in PLL. Under this condition,
there is signal plus noise in the I components and mostly noise in the Q
components. However, this high-precision DLL mode fails if there are fre-
quent loss of phase lock because the signal power is shared in both the I and
Q components, which consequently causes power loss in the coherent DLL.
All of the DLL discriminators can be normalized. Normalization removes
the amplitude sensitivity, which improves performance under rapidly chang-
ing SNR conditions. Therefore, normalization helps the DLL tracking and
threshold performance to be independent of AGC performance. However,
normalization does not prevent reduction of the gain when SNR decreases.
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Chapter 3
Signal model
In this chapter it will be described the signal model used to test the algo-
rithm for spooﬁng detection, in particular there is an explanation of what
diﬀerential GNSS measurements are and which approximations have been
done to verify the performance of the spooﬁng detection technique.
3.1 Diﬀerential GNSS measurements
A single-frequency SPS (Standard Positioning Service) GNSS user can often
attain better than 10 m, 95% positioning and 20 ns, 95% timing accuracy
worldwide. There are many applications, however, that require levels of
accuracy, integrity, availability, and continuity beyond even what a GNSS
PPS (Precise Positioning Service) receiver can provide. For such applications,
augmentation is required. There are two general classes of augmentation:
diﬀerential GNSS (DGNSS) and external sensors/systems.
DGNSS is a method to improve the positioning or timing performance of
GNSS using one or more reference stations at known locations, each equipped
with at least one GNSS receiver. The reference station provides information
to the end user via a data link that may include:
• corrections to the raw end user's pseudorange measurements, correc-
tions to GNSS satellite-provided clock and ephemeris data, or data to
replace the broadcast clock and ephemeris information;
• raw reference station measurements (e.g., pseudorange and carrier phase);
• integrity data (e.g., reliability indications for each visible satellite);
• auxiliary data including the location, health and meteorological data
of the reference station.
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DGNSS techniques may be categorized in diﬀerent ways:
• absolute or relative diﬀerential positioning;
• local area, regional area or wide area;
• code based or carrier based.
In this work I used carrier-based GNNS technique to perform spooﬁng
detection at end user side, in particular I used single diﬀerence carrier phase
(SDCP) between two antennas of a GNSS receiver. This method is easily
adaptable to multi-antenna GNSS receiver.
3.2 Model description
In this section I will describe the signal model used for the spooﬁng detection
algorithm which is the topic of this thesis. Consider a two-antenna assembly
positioned d metres apart from each other with an arbitrary orientation.
The carrier phase Φim at the ith antenna (i = 1, 2) for the mth received PRN
signal can be written as [7]:
Φim =
1
λ
[ρim(t) + c(dtm(t)− dT i(t))−
I i(t)
f 2
+ ζ im(t) + wΦim(t)] +N
i
m (3.1)
where:
• ρim(t) = true range between SV (at transmit time) and receiver (at
receive time) [m]
• Ii(t)
f2
= ionospheric delay parameter [Hz2m)
• f = carrier signal frequency (1575.42 MHz for L1)
• ζ im(t) = measurement delay due to troposphere [m]
• c = speed of light [m/s]
• dT i(t) = receiver clock error [s]
• dtm(t) = satellite clock error [s]
• wΦim(t) = AWGN measurement noise due to receiver an multipath [m]
• λ = wavelength of L1 carrier
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• N im = integer carrier-phase cycle ambiguity [cycles]
The ionospheric error I
i(t)
f2
has a negative sign, reﬂecting the fact that the
ionosphere yields a delay of an advance of the phase measurement [8]. The
term N im is the carrier-phase integer ambiguity. This is necessary because
the carrier-phase observable is not the total range measurement, but it is a
measurement of the accumulated Doppler since a particular time epoch, at
which time there was an unspeciﬁed (N) number of carrier cycles between
the mth satellite and the ith receiver. The term N im can be thought of as a
constant, initially unknown bias added in each of the carrier-phase measure-
ments which happens to be an integer number of cycles. The values for N im
are diﬀerent and independent for measurements between diﬀerent receivers
or diﬀerent satellites. However, the values for N are constant for the whole
observation time.
Based on 3.1, between-receivers single diﬀerence carrier phase ∆Φ1,2m ob-
servations can be written as:
∆Φ1,2m = Φ
1
m − Φ2m
=
1
λ
[∆ρ1,2m (t)− c∆dT 1,2(t)−
∆I1,2(t)
f 2
+ ∆ζ1,2m (t) + w∆Φ1,2m (t)] + ∆N
1,2
m
(3.2)
We observed that the term relative to the satellite clock error in Equation
3.1 disappears in Equation 3.2 because is the same term of the mth satellite.
In addition, receiver noise w∆Φ1,2m (t) remains AWGN due to the fact that I
performed only linear operations.
3.3 Considered approximations
Observing Equation 3.2 and considering the receiver antenna position, we
can simplify SDCP model as:
∆Φ1,2m =
1
λ
[∆ρ1,2m (t) + w∆Φ1,2m (t)] + ∆N
1,2
m (3.3)
This approximations are due to the fact that:
• ionospheric and tropospheric delays are the same on the two antennas
because their short distance;
• the two antennas are synchronised with the same receiver, so the term
c∆dT 1,2(t) disappears.
14 CHAPTER 3. SIGNAL MODEL
Chapter 4
Spooﬁng
In this chapter there will be an overview on spooﬁng, in particular on the pos-
sible attacks and countermeasures to disturb GNSS user navigation. More-
over, there is a description of the particular environment where spooﬁng de-
tection is performed and of the improvements which gives this new algorithm
in spite of the one which is described in [3].
4.1 Spooﬁng techniques
A GNSS spooﬁng attack tries to deceive a GNSS receiver by broadcasting
wrong GPS signals: structured to resemble a set of normal GNSS signals or
by rebroadcasting genuine signals received at a diﬀerent time. These spoofed
signals may be modiﬁed to cause the receiver to estimate its position to be
somewhere other than where it actually is or to be located where it is but
at a diﬀerent time, as determined by the attacker. One common form of
a GNSS spooﬁng attack begins by broadcasting signals synchronized with
the authentic signals observed by the target receiver. The power of the
counterfeit signal is then gradually increased and the receiver follows the
new spoofed signal instead of the authentic one.
Spooﬁng techniques can be divided into three main categories [2], [4], [9].
4.1.1 GNSS signal simulator
In this category a GNSS signal simulator with a RF front-end is used to
resemble authentic GNSS signals. The signals generated by the spoofer are
not essentially synchronized to the real GNSS signals. Therefore, the spooﬁng
signal looks like noise for a receiver operating in the tracking mode. However,
this type of spoofers can eﬀectively deceive commercial GNSS receivers if
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the spooﬁng signal power is higher than the authentic signals. A GNSS
signal simulator is the simplest GNSS spoofer and it can be detected by
diﬀerent antispooﬁng techniques such as amplitude monitoring, consistency
checks among diﬀerent measurements, and consistency check with inertial
measurement units (IMUs).
4.1.2 Receiver-Based Spoofers
A more advanced type of spoofer consists of a GNSS receiver with a spoofer.
This system ﬁrst synchronizes to the current GNSS signals and extracts the
position, time, and satellite ephemeris, and then it generates the spooﬁng
signal knowing the distance between its transmit antenna and the target
receiver antenna. This kind of spoofer is diﬃcult to discriminate from the
authentic signals and is more complicated than the ﬁrst category. The main
challenge for the realization of this spoofer is transmitting the spooﬁng signals
to the intended victim receiver with the correct signal delay and strength.
Note that the spooﬁng power should be slightly higher than the authentic
signal power to successfully mislead the target receiver but it should not be
much more than the typical power of GNSS signals. Aligning the carrier
frequency and phase to the authentic GNSS signals, minimizing the self-
jamming eﬀect and cancelling relative data bit latencies are other limitations
that a receiver-based spoofer should deal with. Carrier phase alignment
to the authentic signals needs centimetre level knowledge of the distance
between the spoofer transmit antenna phase centre and the target receiver
antenna phase centre. Therefore, it would be a great advantage for this
spoofers if the spoofer antenna were very close to the target receiver antenna.
This spoofers are relatively hard to detect since they are synchronized to the
real GNSS satellites and can spoof receivers in tracking mode. Figure 4.1
shows a repeater-spoofer structure proposed by [4].
Figure 4.1: Repeater spoofer block diagram (Fig. from [4])
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4.1.3 Sophisticated Receiver-Based Spoofers
This category is the most complex and eﬀective type of the spooﬁng cate-
gories. This type is assumed to know the centimetre level position of the
target receiver antenna phase centre to perfectly synchronize the spooﬁng
signal code and carrier phase to those of authentic signals at the receiver [9].
This type of spoofer can take advantage of several transmit antennas in order
to defeat direction of arrival antispooﬁng techniques. In this case the spoofer
needs to synthesize an array manifold that is consistent with the array mani-
fold of the authentic signal to defeat an angle of arrival (AOA) discriminating
GNSS receiver. The complexity of constructing such a spoofer is much higher
than the two previous categories discussed above. Compared to the previous
spooﬁng categories, the eﬀectiveness region of this type of spoofer is much
more limited. The reason is that carrier phase alignment and array manifold
synchronization might be achieved only for a very small region where target
receiver antennas are located. In addition, there are some physical limita-
tions regarding the spoofer antenna placement relative to the target receiver
antennas. As such, the realization of this type of spoofers is very diﬃcult and
in many cases impossible due to the geometry and movement of the target
receiver antennas.
4.2 Antispooﬁng techniques
Several antispooﬁng techniques have been proposed in the open literature
and can generally be classiﬁed into two main categories, namely spooﬁng de-
tection and spooﬁng mitigation. Spooﬁng detection algorithms concentrate
on discriminating the spooﬁng signals but they do not necessarily perform
countermeasures against the spooﬁng attack, while spooﬁng mitigation tech-
niques mainly concentrate on neutralizing the detected spooﬁng signals and
help the victim receiver to retrieve its positioning and navigation abilities.
In the following subsections a brief introduction is provided on diﬀerent tech-
niques proposed for spooﬁng detection category, which the topic of interest
of this thesis.
4.2.1 Spooﬁng detection
Based on the Signal Power Monitoring
1. C/N0 monitoring. Most GNSS receivers employ C/N0 measurements
as a parameter that characterizes the received signal quality. In open
sky conditions, only satellite movements and ionosphere variations can
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cause gradual changes in the received signal power. However, when
a higher power spoofer deceives a GNSS receiver, the received C/N0
may experience a sudden change that can indicate the presence of the
spooﬁng signal. The antispooﬁng receiver can continuously monitor the
C/N0 and look for any unusual variation that can be a sign of spooﬁng
attack. It is easy for a GNSS receiver to store a time history of the
signal received from each satellite.
2. Absolute power monitoring. Since the path loss between the spoofer
and target receiver is highly variable, it is diﬃcult for a spoofer to esti-
mate the transmit power required to resemble authentic signal strength
of the authentic GNSS signal at the target receiver [10]. The maxi-
mum received power of the GPS signal at earth devices is around −153
dBW at the L1 frequency [11]. Therefore, reception of a spooﬁng signal
whose absolute power is considerably higher than the expected authen-
tic GNSS signal power is a simple technique of detecting a spooﬁng
attack.
3. Received power variations vs Receiver movement. Based on the free
space square law of propagation, the received power of a free space
propagating signal is proportional to the inverse of the squared prop-
agation distance. GNSS satellites are around 20000 kilometres away
from the earth surface. Therefore, if the receiver moves on the earth
surface in low multipath environments, no considerable change in the
received power from authentic satellites should be observed. However,
the spooﬁng signal is usually transmitted from a single directional an-
tenna located much closer to the receiver compared to the GNSS satel-
lites. Therefore, the movement of the receiver relative to the spoofer
antenna can considerably change the received C/N0 from spooﬁng sig-
nals.
4. L1/L2 power level comparisons. There is a predeﬁned power level diﬀer-
ence between GNSS signals in diﬀerent frequency bands [10] and many
GNSS receivers are able to monitor both L1 and L2 signals. There-
fore, a large diﬀerence between L1 and L2 power levels can reveal the
presence of a spooﬁng signal. This method can successfully detect the
single-band spoofers.
Based on spatial processing
1. Multiantenna spooﬁng discrimination. In [2] a spooﬁng detection tech-
nique is proposed which observes the phase diﬀerence between two ﬁxed
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antennas. Knowing the orientation of the antenna array and the satel-
lites movement trajectory, the theoretical phase diﬀerences can be cal-
culated and compared to the phase diﬀerence observed by the antenna
array to discriminate the spooﬁng threat. The main drawback of the
algorithm is that it takes a long time to discriminate the spooﬁng sig-
nals. In addition, this technique requires a calibrated antenna array
with known array orientation in order to operate properly. The pro-
posed algorithm belongs to this antispooﬁng technique.
2. Synthetic array spooﬁng discrimination. In [12] a spooﬁng detection
technique that employs a synthetic antenna array has been proposed.
In this scenario a single-antenna handheld GNSS receiver is moved
along a random trajectory and forms a synthetic antenna array struc-
ture. The received signals amplitude and phase corresponding to dif-
ferent PRN signals are continually compared to each other using a
correlation coeﬃcient metric (%ij).
Based on TOA discrimination
1. PRN code and data bit latency. In case that the receiver-based spoofer
does not have any prior information regarding the navigation data bits,
it should ﬁrst decode the received GNSS signals and then generate a
processed replica as the spooﬁng signal. Hence, an unavoidable delay
exists between the spooﬁng data bit boundaries with respect to the
authentic ones [4],[13],[14]. Therefore, analysing at which time instants
the data bit transition happens, a spooﬁng attack might be detected.
This technique encounters some limitations because the GNSS data
frame structure is already known and it consists of diﬀerent parts with
diﬀerent update frequencies. The update frequency of most parts of
the GNSS frame is very low. Therefore, the majority of the GNSS data
bits can be predicted by the spoofer if it has already acquired the GNSS
information.
2. L1/L2 signals relative delay. GPS satellites transmit encrypted P(Y)
codes on both L1 and L2 frequencies. The signals received on these
two frequencies have a relative delay/attenuation that is caused by the
diﬀerent frequency response of the ionosphere. Therefore, if a dual
frequency GNSS receiver correlates the L1 and L2 signals, it should
observe only one correlation peak [10]. The propagation delay in L2 is
larger than the L1 frequency, therefore the relative delay of correlation
peaks is already known to the GNSS receiver. The spoofer should be
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able to generate signals on both frequencies in order to defeat this
countermeasure.
Based on Signal Quality Monitoring (SQM)
SQM techniques have been employed to monitor the GNSS correlation peak
quality in multipath fading environments [15]. Spooﬁng attacks on a tracking
receiver can aﬀect the correlator output in a way similar to multipath eﬀect
[16]. Therefore, authors of [9], [17], [18] have extended the SQM techniques
to detect the spooﬁng attack on tracking receivers that are working in line-
of-sight (LOS) condition. They have employed the ratio and delta SQM tests
in order to detect any strange asymmetry and/or ﬂatness of GPS correlation
peaks that is generated by the spooﬁng attack. It is assumed that the receiver
has initially locked onto the authentic correlation peaks and a spooﬁng attack
tries to deceive the receiver to track its fake correlation peaks. The SQM
antispooﬁng techniques are powerful methods to detect the spooﬁng attack
especially in the LOS propagation environments. However, in the presence
of multipath, the SQM method might not be able to discriminate between
spooﬁng signals and multipath reﬂections.
4.3 Algorithm design
4.3.1 Environment description
The algorithm is based on single diﬀerence carrier phase (SDCP) ∆Φ1,2m be-
tween the two antennas of the receiver where one is considered as the reference
of East, North, Up (ENU) local coordinate system. As shown in Fig.4.2, a
represents the vector between reference antenna and the second antenna, and
cm is the vector between the mth satellite and reference antenna. θm(t) and
Ψm(t) are, respectively, the elevation and azimuth angles of the mth satellite,
while θa and Ψa are the elevation and azimuth angles of the second antenna
with respect to the reference antenna. As you can see from Fig.4.2, the mag-
nitude of ∆ρ1,2m (t) is a function of the distance between the two antennas, d,
and the azimuth and elevation angles of incident signals with respect to the
antenna baseline.
To compute the vector cm is necessary to know the satellite ephemeris
which can be downloaded from the broadcast signal of the satellite if you
have the certainty that you are not already being spoofed. Once calculated
the satellite position in the Earth-Fixed Earth-Centered (ECEF) coordinate
system using the algorithm described in Tab. 4.1 and converted it in ENU
local coordinate system, you have all the parameters to perform the algorithm
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Figure 4.2: Proposed double antenna structure (Fig. from [3])
described in the following section. The ephemeris deﬁnition are shown in Tab.
4.2.
Moreover, we suppose that the spoofer has a ﬁx position during the entire
attack duration, as the receiver, and can choose a position which around the
receiver so the parameter θm for the spoofed satellite is set to zero.
4.3.2 Spooﬁng detection algorithm
Deﬁning S = {satellites in view} and F = {spoofed satellites}, the algorithm
is the following:
1. Compute the matrix ∆ΦF(pF) which has as rows the SDCP of the
satellites in view, ∆Φ1,2m , observed during a selectable period of time to,
without noise in ideal conditions.
2. Compute the matrix ∆ΦFe (pF) = ∆Φ−∆ΦF(pF) for ∀F ⊂ S where pF
are the parameters of the attack and ∆Φ are the matrix composed by
the variables ∆Φ1,2m measured by the receiver antennas, so with noise
w∆Φ1,2m (t) which is assumed having constant statistics during the time
period to.
3. Compute (F∗, p∗F) = arg minF∈2S\{0},pF ‖∆ΦFe (pF)‖2F and the corre-
sponding ‖∆ΦF∗e (p∗F)‖2F where ‖ · ‖2F represents the squared Frobenius
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(1) a = (
√
a)2 Semimajor axis
(2) n =
√
µ
a3
+ ∆n Corrected mean motion
(3) tk = t− t0e Time from ephemeris epoch
(4) Mk = M0 + n(tk) Mean anomaly
(5) Mk = Ek − e sinEk Eccentric anomaly
(6) sin νk =
√
1−e2 sinEk
1−e cosEk True anomaly
cos νk =
cosEk−e
1−e cosEk
(7) φk = νk + ω Argument of latitude
(8) δφk = Cus sin(2φk) + Cuc cos(2φk) Argument of latitude correction
(9) δrk = Crs sin(2φk) + Crc cos(2φk) Radius correction
(10) δik = Cis sin(2φk) + Cic cos(2φk) Inclination correction
(11) uk = φk + δφk Corrected argument of latitude
(12) rk = a(1− e cosEk) + δr Corrected radius
(13) ik = i0 + (di/dt)tk + δik Corrected inclination
(14) Ωk = Ω0 + (Ω˙− Ω˙e)(tk)− Ω˙et0e Corrected longitude of node
(15) xp = rk cosuk In-plane x position
(16) yp = rk sinuk In-plane y position
(17) xs = xp cos Ωk − yp cos ik sin Ωk ECEF x-coordinate
(18) ys = xp sin Ωk + yp cos ik cos Ωk ECEF y-coordinate
(19) zs = yp sin ik ECEF z-coordinate
Table 4.1: Computation of a satellite's ECEF position vector (Tab. from
[11])
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t0e Reference time of ephemeris√
a Squared root of semimajor axis
e Eccentricity
i0 Inclination angle (at time t0e)
Ω0 Longitude of the ascending node (at weekly epoch)
ω Argument of perigee (at time t0e)
M0 Mean anomaly (at time t0e)
di/dt Rate of change of inclination angle
Ω˙ Rate of change of longitude of the ascending node
∆n Mean motion correction
Cuc Amplitude of cosine correction to argument of latitude
Cus Amplitude of sine correction to argument of latitude
Crc Amplitude of cosine correction to orbital radius
Crs Amplitude of sine correction to orbital radius
Cic Amplitude of cosine correction to inclination angle
Cis Amplitude of sine correction to inclination angle
Table 4.2: GPS ephemeris data deﬁnition (Tab. from [11])
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norm (sum of squared entries) of a matrix to ﬁnd out the most probable
spoofed satellites.
4. Compute Γ =
‖∆Φ∅e‖2F−‖∆ΦF
∗
e (p
∗
F )‖2F
σw
5. If Γ > γ, then a spooﬁng attack is detected and the spoofed satellites
belong to F∗. In the opposite case there is no spooﬁng attack.
The threshold γ is selected to have a good trade-oﬀ between false alarm
and misdetection probability as it can see on the Results chapter.
In step (1) ∆ΦF(pF) is computed as the diﬀerence between the two pseu-
doranges of the two receiver antennas with each satellite. Due to the fact
that it is necessary to test all possible conﬁgurations of spoofed satellites that
are in view, it has to try all possible 2S matrices.
In step (2) ∆ΦFe (pF) allows to compute the squared error between the
ideal results and the received one in a joint operation without any assumption
of independence between variables. As a consequence, there is no loss of
information.
In step (3) the arg min operation computes the most probable set of
spoofed satellites in case there is a detection of a spooﬁng attack with the
following operation.
In step (4) there is the Likelihood Test which compares the squared errors
of the assumption of no attack and of the most probable set of spoofed
satellites normalized with noise variance σ2w
∆Φ
1,2
m
. The normalization has been
proved by simulation that improves the Likelihood Test performance.
In step (5) the performance of the threshold was tested on all values for
diﬀerent SNRs and then it was chosen the best one considering false alarm
and detection probability.
Finally, to test all attack parameters, pF , it will be described later a
method to reduce the algorithm execution time.
4.4 Improvements from algorithm in [3]
The algorithm proposed in [3] utilizes as variable the Double Diﬀerence Car-
rier Phase (DDCP), ∇∆Φx,y = ∆Φ1,2x − ∆Φ1,2y , and exploits the correlation
of this measurements to build a graph with satellites as node and the edges
are selected if a Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test (GLRT) is greater than a
certain threshold.
This approach is not optimal because DDCP measurements are consid-
ered independent when they are correlated, so we lose information computing
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DDCP from SDCP, and GLRT is used as a hard decision information to build
the unweighted graph.
However, this procedure does not need the satellite ephemeris, but in this
environment it is more probable the ﬁxed receiver knows its position and
can retrieve from other sources the necessary information to derive satellite
ephemeris.
Finally, this algorithm is computationally heavier than the proposed one.
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Chapter 5
Results
In this chapter it will describe the chosen parameters for the simulations and
it will de shown the performance of the proposed algorithm.
5.1 Simulation parameters
I set the observation time, to, to 12 minutes to have a suﬃcient number of
sample to analyse and because in GPS system all data frames are broadcast
in 12,5 minutes so the receiver can perform the algorithm in the remaining
time with a maximum number of satellites in view of 13.
Moreover, I suppose that the receiver estimates the correct value of the
carrier phase cycle ambiguity, N .
Finally, to test all possible parameters is built a grid of 5x5 with a large
resolution to cover all possible spoofer parameter values of Ψs and ds. Then,
at each iteration, the grid resolution is shrunk with the following rules:
• It is always halved for Ψs variable because the initial values span all
360◦ with a resolution of 45◦;
• It is not halved when the smaller error, argmin(F ,pF )
∑
i,j(∆Φ
F
e i,j)
2,
corresponds to one of the two extremes of the grid for the d parameter.
If this is the case, then the central value becomes that with the smaller
error.
Iterations are stopped when the resolution goes under the variance of the
receiver noise, σ2w
∆Φ
1,2
m
.
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(a) SNR = −5dB (b) SNR = −10dB
(c) SNR = −15dB
Figure 5.1: False alarm and misdetection probability at diﬀerent SNR
5.2 False alarm vs Misdetection probability
From Fig.5.1 we can see that the algorithm has good performance because
at low SNR, with an acceptance of small false alarm probability (3.5 · 10−4
for SNR = −5dB, 4.3 · 10−2 for SNR = −10dB, 0.28 for SNR = −15dB),
there is the certainty of the spooﬁng attack detection. I have also tested
higher SNR but the algorithm does not yield any false alarm probability or
misdetection event. However, this does not mean that a spooﬁng attack is
always detected with no false alarm probability but we can aﬃrm that the
false alarm probability is surely under 10−4 due to the fact that I do not run
enough iterations to observe lower false alarm probability.
Comparing this results with the algorithm in [3], it can be seen that
you can set the false alarm probability as small as the user wants, but the
misdetection probability is not null and the obtained results are on collected
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measures in a real environment with good conditions so they does not refer
in an environment with low SNR.
5.3 Spoofed satellite identiﬁcation
(a) 1 spoofed (b) 2 spoofed
(c) 3 spoofed (d) 4 (all) spoofed
Figure 5.2: Mean value of detection probability for diﬀerent spoofed satellites
From Fig.5.2, after the detection of a spooﬁng attack, we can see that the
correct set identiﬁcation of the spoofed satellites can be considered correct
until the SNR = −8dB. At lower SNR the probability of identifying correct
spoofed satellites goes down.
However, considering the GPS system design, with a commercial GPS
receiver the SNR is between 22 and 29 dB [11] and at this SNR values the
proposed algorithm has very good performance.
Comparing this results with the algorithm in [3], it can be seen that
the set identiﬁcation of spoofed satellites has a non-negligible misdetection
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probability in a real environment with good condition and it is not tested
with low SNR, so in the same condition the proposed algorithm outperforms
the one in [3].
Chapter 6
Conclusions
Spooﬁng attack on GNSS receivers has been considered as a serious threat
to mobile phone network synchronisation problem since it uses the GNSS
system to synchronize the network. As a consequence, a correct GNSS solu-
tion is necessary to have the certainty that the mobile phone network works
properly. In this thesis a scenario of a ﬁxed spoofer with a single antenna
and a ﬁxed receiver with multiple antennas is considered and an improved
version of the algorithm proposed in [3] is tested.
The proposed algorithm performance are very good because, with an
acceptance of low false alarm probability, there is the certainty of detecting a
spooﬁng attack and for SNR > −8dB spoofed satellites are surely identiﬁed.
However, the proposed algorithm needs to know the receiver position and
to initially be certain to not be under attack to correctly receive the satellite
ephemeris or to be connected to internet to recover them, which is not a rare
situation as in the case of mobile phone network.
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